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Abstract 
Many U.S. banks failed or performed poorly during the recent financial crisis.  Although the costliest failures were 
large institutions, the majority of failures were community banks (less than $1 billion in total assets).  Community 
banks, which are considered instrumental in small business lending and employment growth, face different risks and 
challenges than their larger counterparts, including a lack of economies of scale and scope and exclusion from “too-
big-to-fail” status.  These challenges, coupled with the recent failures, motivate research into potential strategies 
managers can use to improve performance.  This study examined the relationship between three potential 
diversification strategies and community bank risk-adjusted performance from 2007 to 2011.  Understanding these 
relationships could improve management’s decision-making, allowing them to choose risk-mitigating strategies 
during a severe economic downturn.  Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes (HHIs) were calculated as proxies for 
geographic, activity, and asset diversification.  Multiple regression models for each of the five years were used to 
calculate the impact of diversification variables on risk-adjusted ROA.  The results show that diversification in all 
areas is directly related to performance; however, only the asset diversification relationship is significant.  To the 
extent possible for community banks, diversification may improve risk-adjusted performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Since 2007, the United States’ financial sector has experienced significant turmoil.  The crash of the housing market 
and the resulting recession characterized by low consumer confidence and high unemployment led to numerous bank 
and other financial firm failures, financial industry consolidation, and extensive government intervention (Catanach & 
Ragatz, 2010).  While most of the popular media attention focused on the performance of the largest financial 
conglomerates and commercial banks and the financial assistance extended to those institutions, community banks 
were also impacted.  Of the 417 banks that failed during 2007 through 2011, 355, or 85%, were community banks 
with less than $1 billion in total assets.  The dollar amount of these failures ($98 billion) pales in comparison to the 
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$573 billion of the 62 largest failures, including Washington Mutual ($307 billion) and IndyMac ($31 billion), but the 
impact upon local deposit and loan customers remains substantial (FDIC Failure Data, 2012).   
It is tempting to dismiss the importance of community banks to the macro economy given their relative small size.  
However, a sizable body of literature suggests that community banks play a significant role in small business lending 
given small business dependence upon financial institutions rather than capital markets and the use of “soft” 
information needed to make credit decisions regarding these opaque firms.  Smaller financial institutions are more 
likely to obtain this information, build a relationship with the potential customer, and maintain a banking relationship 
with small businesses (Berger & Udell, 2002; Scott, 2004; Cole, Goldberg & White, 2004).  Although there have 
been critics (Davis, Haltiwanger & Schuh, 1996), conventional wisdom holds that small businesses are responsible 
for more job creation than larger firms (Birch, 1979), giving them a particularly important role in an economy with 
high unemployment. Due to the link between community banks and small business lending and employment, 
community bank health should be a concern for policymakers and other economic participants.  
Given the role of community banks within the economy, what are the factors that impact the risk and performance of 
these institutions?  In particular, what community bank management strategies appear to be the most effective during 
a negative economic shock such as that resulting from the contraction of the housing market during 2007 and 
forward?  This study aimed to further the literature on bank diversification by focusing on a period of industry 
instability and analyzing the impact of three different diversification strategies (asset, activity, and geographic) on 
risk-adjusted performance of individual institutions.  The impact of three Hirschman-Herfindahl Indexes (HHIs) used 
as proxies of geographic, asset, and activity diversification on risk-adjusted ROA was assessed using multiple 
regression analysis of cross-sectional data for the five-year period.   
This research differs from previous bank diversification studies by covering a time period largely unstudied in the 
existing literature and by focusing exclusively on community banks.  The five year period exhibited extreme industry 
volatility and includes a data set after full implementation of the Riele-Neal Act of 1994 and the Gramm Leach Bliley 
Act of 1999 (GLBA), important milestones for bank diversification practices that are discussed in more detail in the 
next section.  Cotugno and Stefanelli (2012) conducted a study for a similar time period (2005 through 2010) for 
Italian banks, and Shim (2013) used data through 2011 to analyze the impact of the business cycle and revenue 
diversification on a bank’s capital position; however, neither of these studies examined diversification at U.S. banks.  
With the exception of Stiroh (2004b), other recent studies have either used the population of all commercial 
banks/financial firms or have analyzed market value data, which by nature eliminates many community banks from 
the analysis.  Given the research population and time frame under consideration, the results of this study should be 
meaningful for both community bank managers and regulatory agencies as it gives insight regarding the ability of a 
community bank to survive or thrive during a negative economic shock.    
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2. Theoretical Foundations 
2.1 Impact of Regulation and Industry Changes on Performance 
 
The banking industry has changed significantly in structure and range of services since 1970, driven by a combination 
of regulatory factors, technological advances, and customers’ changing financial demands and payment methods 
(DeYoung, Hunter & Udell, 2004).  Although the banking industry has always been heavily regulated, the level of 
regulatory control has cycled.  Given the turmoil in the banking industry coinciding with the Great Depression, 
President Roosevelt signed the Banking Act of 1933, commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, into law on June 
16, 1933 (FDIC History, 1984).  A key provision of this act required the separation of commercial and investment 
banking activities (Akhigbe & Whyte, 2001).  In addition to activity and asset restrictions, other federal regulations 
prohibited interstate branching, and many states had restrictive branching laws.  Therefore, during the 1960s and 
1970s commercial banks were relatively small and offered a traditional slate of services (DeYoung et al., 2004). 
Volatile economic conditions and deregulation that started in the 1980s brought change and the potential for 
additional risk to the banking industry (FDIC History, 1984).  During the 1990s globalization and pricing pressures 
on traditional banking activities reduced profitability for large commercial banks, prompting industry executives to 
demand regulatory change.  Banks also faced increasing competition for funds from the rapidly growing mutual fund 
industry (Khorana, Servaes & Tufano, 2005).  This combination of factors culminated in the passage of the Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999, more commonly known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) (Czyrnik & 
Klein, 2004; Akhigbe & Whyte, 2001), which allowed financial holding companies to engage in insurance 
underwriting, securities underwriting and dealing, and merchant banking.  As predicted, GLBA spurred consolidation 
within the industry as well as an expansion of activities conducted by commercial banks and the new financial 
holding companies (Mamun, Hassaan & Maroney, 2005), resulting in the percentage of total assets held by the largest 
financial firms (greater than $10 billion in assets) increasing from 62.9% in 1999 to 79.6% on December 31, 2011 
(FDIC Ratios, 2012).   
Geographic restrictions on banking were also gradually eliminated during this same time period.  The Riegle-Neal 
Act of 1994 negated the McFadden Act of 1927 ban on interstate branching, and from 1980 through 1994 32 states 
loosened their intrastate branch banking restrictions.  Deregulation, competition, and industry consolidation forced 
the total number of banks from 17,886 on March 31, 1984, to 7,357 as of December 31, 2011 (FDIC Annual Income, 
2012). 
Prior to the industry changes of the last few decades just described, commercial banks generated the bulk of their 
operating income from net interest income (NII) and non-interest income (NONII) sources comprised only about 20% 
of total operating income (DeYoung & Rice, 2004a).  Although NII remains a significant source of operating income, 
NONII generated from both traditional activities and non-traditional activities has become increasingly important for 
commercial banks.  However, smaller institutions not only have a much lower level of NONII, but the sources of this 
revenue are more likely to be traditional banking activities such as fees on deposit accounts or cash management.  
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Conversely, NONII comprises about 50% of total operating income for larger institutions and largely stems from 
mortgage securitization, credit cards, investment banking, and fiduciary accounts (DeYoung & Rice, 2004a). 
Although conventional wisdom has assumed that the growing reliance upon NONII  is both necessary and a way to 
reduce a firm’s risk profile, this has not been consistently confirmed by empirical data (DeYoung & Roland, 1999; 
Stiroh, 2004a; DeYoung & Rice, 2004b). Stiroh (2004a) and DeYoung and Rice (2004b) both found that an increased 
focus on non-interest income is associated with a decline in risk-adjusted performance. NONII may produce higher 
levels of earnings, but the increased volatility reduces risk-adjusted performance measures.  NII and NONII became 
more highly correlated during the 1990s, indicating that moving into NONII fields may not provide diversification 
benefits, a relationship noted both within the US and internationally (DeJonghe, 2009; Nguyen, 2012).  The overall 
conclusion of these studies is that NONII may not result in diversification benefits.  This study examined this 
relationship during a crisis period. 
2.2. Financial Crisis 
The immediate cause of the recession was the “bust” in the housing market following an almost steady thirty-year rise 
in housing prices.  Real estate appreciation increased relatively rapidly after the 2000-2001 recession, reaching a peak 
2007 before falling steadily through 2011 (FHFA, 2012).  Some states, including Nevada, Arizona, Florida, and 
California, recognized both higher price appreciation and a subsequent higher percentage decline in real estate prices.  
Macroeconomic conditions caused both asset quality and earnings concerns for the banking industry.  Declining 
collateral values increased the risk of real estate-backed assets, the declining employment picture reduced the 
repayment capacity of retail loan customers, and declining consumer sentiment and overall business conditions 
threatened the repayment of commercial loans.  At the peak of the crisis approximately 35% of banks reported 
negative earnings, and overall 2011 profitability remained below pre-recession levels (FDIC Ratios, 2012).  The fact 
that a majority of institutions continued to report positive earnings indicates that institutions were not equally 
impacted by the housing market bust and the ensuing recession.   
2.3 Theoretical Foundations of Diversification 
Bank diversification studies comprise a small component of the larger corporate diversification literature.  Diamond’s 
(1984) seminal model for financial intermediary diversification concluded commercial banks and insurers could 
reduce risk through portfolio diversification.  As investors in risky assets banks can reduce volatility by using 
diversification to invest in cash flows imperfectly correlated.  Therefore, banks can achieve a more favorable risk-
return frontier, as discussed by Markowitz (1952; 1959) in the development of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT). 
Early empirical studies from the 1980s and 1990s (i.e. prior to GLBA) used synthetic mergers to study the potential 
impact on both earnings and risk from the convergence of commercial banking, insurance, securities, and real estate 
investments (Laderman, 2000; Emmons, Gilbert & Yeager, 2004).  These studies generally concurred with Diamond.  
In a review of these and other similar studies, Kwan and Laderman (1999) concluded that “Broadening banking 
firms’ revenue base can improve their earnings stability and provide them with a better trade-off between risk and 
return” (p. 30).   
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Three primary types of diversification (geographic, asset, and activity) are assessed in empirical bank diversification 
studies (Deng, Elyasiani, & Mao, 2007).   Geographic diversification refers to the expanse of geographic area from 
which a bank’s deposits and assets are based; asset diversification denotes the variety found in the institution’s 
balance sheet both among larger asset categories (i.e. cash, securities, and loans) and the breakdown of those 
individual groups (i.e. loan types); and activity diversification, or revenue diversification, depicts the variety of 
revenue sources.  This latter definition of diversification helps to identify the importance of NII versus NONII or to 
discern the reliance upon specific NONII sources and involvement in nontraditional banking services such as asset 
securitization, insurance sales, or securities income.     
2.3.1 Geographic diversification 
The economic performance of the surrounding geographic area affects a bank’s financial performance (Aubuchon & 
Wheelock, 2010).  Factors such as key employers, real estate markets, and financial health of local and state 
governments can impact the viability of a financial institution and can be good predictors of individual bank 
performance and credit quality (Zimmerman, 1996; Aubuchon & Wheelock, 2010; Meyer & Yeager, 2001).    Despite 
the relaxing of both state and federal branching regulations, many banks still operate within a small geographic area 
that exposes them to regional economic conditions (Aubuchon & Wheelock, 2010).     
The rationale for geographic diversification is that a bank’s performance is not limited to the economy of one 
particular area.  The empirical results for geographic diversification generally show positive performance benefits 
(Morgan & Samolyk, 2003; Emmons, Gilbert & Yeager, 2004; Deng, 2007; Deng & Elyasiani, 2008; Schmid & 
Walter, 2012; Cotugno & Stefanelli, 2012); however, there are some exceptions. Deng and Elyasiani cautioned that 
the benefits of geographic diversification may be offset by increasing agency costs at larger distances (Deng & 
Elyasiani, 2008; Goetz, Laeven, & Levine, 2013).   
Given the concentration of foreclosure activity within certain states and cities, it is reasonable to assume that the 
performance of institutions with a wider geographic base may not have experienced the decline faced by others 
during 2007-2011.  However, the degree of geographic diversification by community banks may be insufficient to 
have a significant impact on performance.      
2.3.2 Asset and activity diversification 
The empirical results for asset and activity diversification are decidedly mixed.  In partial support of Diamond’s 
theory, asset diversification has been associated with a lower bond yield-spread, particularly for medium-sized banks; 
however, activity diversification did not necessarily show the same risk-reduction capability (Deng et al., 2007).  
Templeton and Severiens (1992) found strong evidence of risk-reduction with an expanded scope of activities, such 
as security underwriting and insurance, while Lepetit, Patry, and Rous (2004) found a positive value effect for 
activity and geographic diversification using event study methodology to assess the impact of merger and acquisition 
activity on the value of target firms in the European banking industry.  In addition, value appeared to be created for 
the acquiring firm when the transactions resulted in more cross-product diversification or less geographic 
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diversification.  Banks in India were more profitable and had a higher Tobin’s Q when their income was derived from 
multiple sources; however, asset diversity did not appear to impact firm value (Ghosh, 2011).  Cotugno and Stefanelli 
(2012) found improvements in risk-adjusted bank performance from asset diversification at Italian banks, while Shim 
(2013) considered the impact of the business cycle and NONII on a bank’s capital buffer and found evidence that a 
diversified revenue base is related with a stronger capital buffer.  
The above studies noted at least some benefits from either asset or activity diversification, but other studies do not 
report positive benefits from diversifying characteristics (DeLong, 2001; Acharya, Hasan & Saunders, 2006; 
Mercieca, Schaeck & Wolfe, 2007; Laeven & Levine, 2007; Schmid & Walter, 2009).  A study of US financial 
industry mergers showed the market preferred activity-focusing mergers over those resulting in diversification 
(DeLong, 2001), and management effectiveness can deteriorate if lending expands to new or more competitive 
industries (Acharya et al., 2006).  Several authors noted diversification discounts for U.S. financial conglomerates 
(Laeven & Levine; 2007; Schmid & Walter, 2009), and Stiroh (2004a) found no benefit from activity diversification 
when using either the level or composition of NONII.  The same author (2004b) also studied links between various 
types of diversification and risk-adjusted performance for all U.S. community banks (less than $300 million in total 
assets) and found diversification benefits within the loan portfolio, but a higher level of NONII was negatively related 
to risk-adjusted performance.  He proposed that diversification benefits may be mitigated by exposure to more 
volatile revenue streams or from engaging in activities for which they do not have a comparative advantage, a 
position similarly noted at financial holding companies from 1997 through 2002 (Stiroh & Rumble, 2006).  Fomby, 
Gunther and Hu (2012) found an increasing dependence of returns among banks, insurance underwriters, securities 
brokerage, and mortgage financers during the recent crisis, casting doubt on the risk-adjusted benefits commercial 
banks can glean from diversifying into these areas.   
With the exception of the Fomby et al. (2012) article the studies just referenced use data from approximately the same 
time period of the mid-1980s through about 2000 to 2004.  Limited research has been conducted for the years 
subsequent to GLBA’s passage in 1999, and only Goetz et al.’s (2013) study of geographic diversification (1986 
through 2007) and Shim’s (2013) consideration of revenue diversification on capital levels (1992 through 2011) cover 
the time period used in this study.  The years previously studied were generally stable for the commercial banking 
industry.  Therefore, the impact of the housing market bust and the relatively severe economic downturn provide an 
opportunity to assess the impact of diversification upon bank performance during a widespread and severe economic 
shock. 
3. Research and Methodology 
3.1 Data Analysis 
Consistent with prior bank diversification studies (Acharya et al., 2006; Baele et al., 2007; Deng et al., 2007; Deng & 
Elyasiani, 2008; Ghosh, 2011; Schmid & Walter, 2009; Stiroh ,2004a & b; Stiroh & Rumble, 2006), the relationships 
between risk-adjusted performance and bank diversification were assessed using multiple linear regression analysis.   
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3.2 Sample  
The necessary data was obtained from governmental secondary sources.  Call Reports filed quarterly by commercial 
banks with federal regulators and Summary of Deposits (SOD) submitted as of June 30 of each year contained the 
necessary bank data.  MSA unemployment rates obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a list of publicly-traded 
banks made available by The Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Center for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) and the University of Chicago, and a query report of de novo institutions obtained from the FDIC’s 
Institution Directory provided the remaining data necessary for the research variables.   
The definition of a community bank has changed over time as all financial institutions have increased in size.  A 
maximum threshold of $1 billion in total assets is a “typical” upper threshold for identifying community banks 
(DeYoung et al. 2004). A minimum cutoff of $100 million in total assets was used given the inability of the smallest 
institutions to achieve significant diversification (Elyasiani & Mehdian, 1995; Wheelock & Wilson, 2001; Yeager, 
2004; Berger, Rosen & Udell, 2007).  Financial institutions, including both banks and thrifts, with total assets greater 
than $100 million but less than $1 billion included 4,424 institutions and held 10% of total industry assets as of 
December 31, 2007 (FDIC Ratios, 2012).     
After excluding de novo institutions (established since January 1, 1997), publicly-traded banks, and rural banks 
(institutions without a branch in an MSA), a sample of 500 banks was selected.  Each of these characteristics has been 
found to systematically alter earnings performance (Stiroh, 2004b; Akhigbe & McNulty, 2003; Akhigbe & McNulty, 
2005; Nichols, Wahlen and Wieland, 2009).  As of December 31, 2007, 2,075 banks remained in the population after 
the exclusions identified above.  The original sample taken from December 31, 2007, was used for all five years of 
the study.  Institutions that failed during the five years were included for the period of their existence, while merged 
institutions were subsequently included with the acquiring institution and remained in the sample during subsequent 
years only if the acquiring institution was also part of the sample.  Banks whose asset growth or decline resulted in 
total assets greater than $1 billion or less than $100 million for 2008 and forward were only included for the years 
where they met the size parameters. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
3.3. Hypotheses 
Based on the discussion of previous empirical diversification studies, the null and research hypotheses are listed 
below.  Geographic diversification is predicted to have a positive relationship on risk-adjusted performance, but the 
impact of activity and asset diversification is not predicted given the mixed results of past studies. 
H0A:  Geographic diversification has no relationship to risk-adjusted performance at U.S. community banks between 
2007 and 2011. 
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H1A:  Geographic diversification is related to improved risk-adjusted performance at U.S. community banks between 
2007 and 2011. 
H0B:  Activity diversification has no relationship to risk-adjusted performance at U.S. community banks between 2007 
and 2011. 
H1B:  Activity diversification is related to risk-adjusted performance at U.S. community banks between 2007 and 
2011. 
H0C:  Asset diversification has no relationship to risk-adjusted performance at U.S. community banks between 2007 
and 2011. 
H1C:  Asset diversification is related to risk-adjusted performance at U.S. community banks between 2007 and 2011. 
3.4 Variables 
The regression model contains three groups of variables:  independent variables measuring the three types of 
diversification, a dependent variable representing risk-adjusted performance, and control variables.  Each variable, 
along with its contribution to the research, is discussed below.   
Independent variables.  The independent variables serve as a proxy for geographic, activity, or asset diversification.  
The diversification measures are based on an HHI as is common in other bank diversification studies (Acharya et al., 
2006; Deng et al., 2007; Ghosh, 2011; Schmid & Walter, 2009; Stiroh, 2004b) and following the precedence 
established by Comment and Jarrell (1993) and Lang and Stulz (1994) in broader corporate diversification studies.   
Geographic diversification.  Community bank diversification is measured with an HHI that considers the distribution 
of deposits at branches across metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.  This is 
similar to the geographical measure used by Morgan and Samolyk (2003) to assess geographic diversification among 
US bank holding companies.  Cotugno and Stefanelli (2012) used a similar measure in Italy; however, they used only 
the number of branches rather than the dollar amount of deposits.  The annual SOD data provides the dollar amount 
of deposits associated with each branch and the branch’s MSA location, allowing for an estimate of the proportion of 
the bank’s activity that is conducted in each MSA.  In mathematical terms, the indicator is calculated as follows: 
  
        (1) 
    
 where i represents the ith bank for time period t (2007 through 2011) and j represents the MSA where it is located 
(j=1, 2, 3, …k, where k is equal to 371 MSAs as of December 2006).  The value of this indicator using proportions 
for each MSA ranges from 0 to 1, where a value of 1 indicates all of a bank’s deposits are in the same MSA.  Similar 
to Morgan and Samolyk (2003), deposits at branches not located within an MSA were summed and reported as one 
area.  The index was calculated for each bank for each of the five years. 
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Based on previous studies (Cotugno & Stefanelli, 2012; Deng & Elyasiani, 2008; Deng, Elyasiani & Mao, 2007), an 
increase in geographic diversification, as measured by HHIGeo  is expected to have a positive impact on risk-based 
performance.  Higher diversification is represented by a lower HHIGeo, which means the coefficient for this variable is 
expected to be negative. 
Activity diversification. Activity diversification relates to the variety found in a bank’s sources of revenue, particularly 
the level of NONII and the variety of sources for NONII.  Similar to Stiroh (2004b), Deng, Elyasiani and Mao (2007), 
and Schmid and Walter (2009), an HHI of NONII categories was used to capture the level of activity diversification.  
The HHI for NONII is the sum of squares for each segment as a proportion of total NONII.  A high value 
demonstrates a concentration of fee-generating sources, while institutions with a diverse NONII base would have a 
relatively low HHI.       
The noninterest income categories for which information is available in the Call Reports are included in the equation 
below.  The mathematical calculation for the variable is shown below: 
  
  (2) 
where i represents the ith bank for time period t (2007 through 2011), NON is the sum of noninterest income, FID is 
fiduciary income, SRV is service charges on deposit accounts, TRAD is trading revenue, S&I is the sum of all 
securities brokerage, investment banking, annuity, and insurance fees and commissions, VENT is venture capital 
revenue, SERV is net servicing fees, SEC is net securitization income, GAINS is the sum of gains/losses on sales of 
loans, other real estate, and other assets, and OTH is other noninterest income.  The possibility exists that a bank will 
report negative income for one of the nine noninterest income categories.  While the mathematics of the equation (i.e. 
squaring) would still result in a positive number, a straight summation of the NONII categories may underrepresent 
the portfolio of noninterest-bearing activities.  In order to incorporate the magnitude of all NONII elements, the 
absolute value of reported income for each NONII category was summed to obtain the denominator (NON).  This 
forces the index values to a domain of zero and one, while continuing to provide a proxy of diversification in NONII 
activity. 
Asset diversification. Asset diversification refers to the dispersion of total assets among large asset groups, such as 
cash, loans, and investments, and the variety among types of loans and/or securities.  Given the role of residential real 
estate lending in the recent financial crisis, it is beneficial to consider each community bank’s loan portfolio mix 
using an HHI for the loan portfolio.  Similar HHIs for asset diversification were utilized by Acharya et al. (2006), 
Deng et al. (2007), Ghosh (2011), Schmid and Walter (2009), and Stiroh (2004b).  If a bank has a loan portfolio well-
represented across all loan types, the HHI will be relatively low; a bank with a high concentration in one or two types 
will have a relatively high index.   
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The loan types reported in the Call Report are included in the calculation below.  In mathematical terms, the index is 
as shown: 
             (3) 
where i is the ith bank for time period t (2007 through 2011), LOANS is the sum of all loans, 1-4RE are loans secured 
by 1-4 family residential properties, CONST is loans secured by real estate and used for construction or other land 
development, FARM is loans secured by farmland, MULTI is loans secured by multifamily residential properties, 
CRE is loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties, AG is agricultural loans, CI is all commercial and 
industrial loans, CONS is consumer loans, including credit cards, and OTH is the sum of loans to depository 
institutions, foreign or state and local governments, lease financing, and other loans.   
As detailed already, previous empirical studies do not provide a clear picture of the impact of activity or asset 
diversification on risk-based performance.  The inconsistent results make it impossible to predict the coefficient sign 
for these independent variables.  If a low covariance exists between sources noninterest income, indicating benefits 
from diversification, the resulting sign would be negative.  However, previous studies support the possibility of a 
positive coefficient.  Greater loan portfolio diversification which would have limited a bank’s exposure to the real 
estate market downturn may improve risk-adjusted performance and result in a negative coefficient, but previous 
studies do not uniformly support this position. 
Dependent variable.  Most community banks are privately held, therefore, an accounting-based dependent variable is 
more useful than a market-based measure.  Risk-adjusted ROA (RAPROA) was used as the dependent variable for this 
study and is calculated as follows: 
           (4) 
 where i is the ith bank for time period t (2007 through 2011), ROA is the return on assets calculated as net income 
divided by total assets, and σROA is the standard deviation of the ith bank’s ROA for the years 2007 through 2011.   
Control variables. In order to control for other factors that may impact the risk-adjusted performance of community 
banks, the following control variables were used. 
a. Residential Real Estate Lending (SHRE):  Historically, financial institutions were primarily exposed to real 
estate lending through direct lending.  However, the growth in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) means that 
banks may be exposed to real estate market weaknesses outside of their normal market area.  In order to 
measure the total exposure to residential real estate, the proportion of residential real estate secured assets to 
total assets was used as a control variable.  Mathematically this variable is shown as: 
           (5) 
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where i is the ith bank for time period t (2007 through 2011), MBS is the total of mortgage-backed securities, and TA 
is total assets.  A higher ratio indicates more exposure to the volatile residential real estate market of 2007 through 
2011, resulting in a negative coefficient prediction.    
b. Asset Size (TA):  Larger institutions may be able to benefit from economies of scale and higher risk-adjusted 
performance (Demsetz & Strahan, 1997; Wheelock & Wilson, 2001; Demsetz & Strahan, 1997; Hunter & 
Udell, 2004; Akhigbe & McNulty, 2005; deHaan & Poghosyan, 2012).  Total assets were used to control for 
differences in performance related to size.  Based on these studies, a positive relationship between asset size 
and risk-adjusted performance, a positive coefficient for TA, is expected. 
c. Multi-Bank Holding Company (MBHC):  A dummy variable denoted a bank’s membership in a multi-bank 
holding company.  MBHC membership allows affiliated banks to buy and sell loans from one another or for 
capital transfers from stronger to weaker subsidiaries (Holod & Peek, 2010).  Affiliation could encourage 
greater risk-taking by management, resulting in lower risk-adjusted performance and a subsidization of 
weaker subsidiaries (Scharfstein & Stein, 2000) or could promote greater “efficiency-enhancing 
specialization among bank subsidiaries” (Holod & Peek, 2010, p. 879) and cost efficiency (Newman & 
Shrieves, 1993).  It is estimated that MBHC affiliation (variable equals 1) will have a positive impact on 
risk-adjusted performance, shown with a positive MBHC variable coefficient. 
d. MSA Unemployment Rate (UNEMP):  The effects of the recent macroeconomic downturn were not evenly 
distributed across the U.S. as some regions exhibited higher than average real estate foreclosures and 
unemployment.  Community banks operating in these areas of greater volatility are inherently more likely to 
have experienced a decline in risk-adjusted performance.  In order to consider this disparity, the average 
annual unemployment rate for the bank’s primary MSA is used to proxy for macroeconomic conditions and 
is expected to be negative.     
e. Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio (RBC):  Total Risk-Based Capital is calculated as risk-based capital divided 
by risk-weighted assets and serves as a proxy for management’s risk tolerance.  Bank managers who are 
willing to take on more risk are likely to operate the institution with a lower level of capital protection 
(Acharya et al., 2006; Demsetz & Strahan, 1997; Stiroh, 2004a; Stiroh, 2004b).  It is expected that the level 
of capital is positively related to risk-adjusted performance resulting in a positive coefficient for this 
variable.   
f. Total Loans to Total Assets (TL/TA):  This variable provides information regarding a bank’s risk profile and 
earnings capacity.  Loans are usually the most risky commercial bank assets and yield a corresponding risk 
premium.  Therefore, a higher percentage of loans may simultaneously boost earnings, but also increase risk 
(Stiroh & Rumble, 2006).  Therefore, the sign of the coefficient for the variable, TL/TA, is not predicted.     
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
The proposed equation can be summarized as follows: 
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             (6) 
where i is the ith bank in time period t and β1 through β8 are the parameters to be estimated.  Both the constant (α) and 
the error term (εi) are also identified in the model. 
4. Results  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Data was collected on an original sample of 500 community banks existing as of December 31, 2007.  Several of 
these banks dropped out of the sample by December 31, 2011, due to merger, failure, or falling outside the study size 
parameters.  Other records were missing necessary information.  Tables 4 through 8 show the number of banks 
included in each year’s regression model, along with descriptive statistics and skewness and kurtosis statistics for the 
continuous independent and dependent variables.  Table 9 shows the frequency information for the categorical 
variable HCTMULT (multi-bank holding company). 
The range of the dependent variable, RAPROA, is greater in 2007 and 2008 as a result of more negative values in those 
two years.  The maximum values cover a relatively narrow range from 32.55 to 34.91; the mean covers a range of 
2.98 in 2009 to 3.99 in 2007.  This is consistent with generally positive earnings in 2007 compared with weaker 
earnings in 2009. 
The diversification measures show that significant variation in the extent of diversification exists within all three 
types across the sample.  The proxy for asset diversification, HHILoan shows greater diversification with both lower 
minimums and a lower mean than either HHIAct or HHIGeo.  The mean for HHIAct demonstrates a consistent trend 
towards greater diversification over the five-year period, indicating the sample banks further diversified their NONII 
revenue stream.  Geographic diversification appears to be relatively limited, although some banks exhibit strong 
geographic diversification as shown in the minimums of 0.28 to 0.29.  The much larger HHIGeo means show that 
geographic diversification is limited in this sample of community banks. 
Distinct trends in the means of the TA, UNEMP, RBC, and TL/TA variables are also evident.  With the exception of 
2009, the average size of the community bank sample increased over the five-year period.  As expected from known 
overall macroeconomic conditions, the average MSA unemployment rate for the banks in the sample increased from 
2007 through 2010, before falling in 2011.  Average RBC decreased slightly in 2008 before steadily increasing 
through 2011, which may be indicative of lower risk tolerance on the part of bank management resulting from the 
financial crisis.  It is also likely a factor of the falling TL/TA ratios from 2008 to 2011 as the higher risk-weighting for 
loans would  increase the RBC ratio.       
Three records were removed from the data given their extreme outlier status.  One of the institutions is part of the 
sample for years 2007 and 2008 before being merged with another institution not found in the sample.  Given a very 
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small variation in the ROA for those two years, the standard deviation was very small, yielding a high dependent 
variable and residual standard deviation. One record from 2010 is an institution with extremely negative earnings.  
This bank drops from the sample during the following year as its size nearly doubles taking it out of the size 
parameters.  These three records were removed from the sample and the descriptive statistics and regression analysis 
for those three years were redone and are as reported herein. 
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
4.2 Normality   
One of the underlying assumptions of multiple regression is normality of the variables and the error term of the 
variate.  Given the large sample sizes found in each of the five regression models used for this study, the detrimental 
effects of nonnormality are reduced and may be negligible (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 2010).  Normality was 
assessed in this study through the use of skewness and kurtosis values for the individual variables and by examining a 
histogram and P-Plot of the standardized residuals.  The skewness and kurtosis values of a normal distribution are 
zero, with increasing nonnormality depicted as values further from zero.  Tables 4 through 8 give the skewness and 
kurtosis values for each individual variable.  The most egregious instances of nonnormality exist for the dependent 
variable, RAPROA, and the RBC and HHILoan independent variables, all of which show a leptokurtic distribution. 
Standardized residual histograms and P-Plots depicted nonnormality in the variate.  Given the sample size, the 
detrimental effects should be negligible on the model.  However, in order to obtain normality and assess its impact on 
the regression models, the log of the dependent variable, RAPROA, was also used.  The results of the regression 
models using the log of RAPROA as the dependent variable found minimal changes to the overall model.  In order to 
use the transformed dependent variable, the records with a negative dependent variable must be dropped from the 
model.  Given the prevalence of negative risk-adjusted performance during a financial crisis, this limits the usefulness 
of the overall results.  Therefore, it was considered more important to retain the negative dependent variable values 
than to achieve normality, particularly given the sample size of the models.  The adjusted regression results are found 
in the Appendix. 
4.3 Regression Results 
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A linear regression model was run for each year with RAPROA as the dependent variable and nine independent 
variables.  Eight of the independent variables were continuous, while the dummy variable for being part of a multi-
bank holding company (MBHC) is categorical with the presence of a multi-bank holding company coded as 1 and a 
one-bank holding company or no holding company coded as 0.  The correlation coefficients for the five models are 
given in Tables 10 through 14.  The results for all five years, including the number of records, r-squared, adjusted r-
squared, F-test statistics, and the regression coefficients are found in Table 15. 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
[Insert Table 13 Here] 
[Insert Table 14 Here] 
[Insert Table 15 Here] 
 
As noted in the table, the r-squared and adjusted r-squared values indicate that a relatively low level of the variation 
in the dependent variable is explained by the nine independent variables.  The 2007 model shows only 4.5% of the 
variation in RAPROA is explained, while 10% of the variation in the 2009 values for RAPROA is explained by the 
model’s independent variables.  The remaining models depict adjusted r-squared values between these two limits.  
The relatively low adjusted r-squared values are not unlike those recognized in previously-published bank 
diversification studies (Cotugno & Stefanelli, 2012; Stiroh & Rumble, 2006; Schmid & Walter, 2009).   
4.4. Regression Equations 
Using the resulting regression coefficients for each year, the following equations can be used to estimate the risk-
adjusted return on assets for community banks. 
             (7) 
             (8) 
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             (9) 
                       (10) 
                       (11) 
4.5 Regression Model Analysis 
The independent variables with a significant relationship to RAPROA at the 0.05 significance level in at least one of 
the five regression models include:  HHILoan, SHRE, MBHC, UNEMP, and RBC.  The HHILoan regression coefficient is 
consistently negative, indicating that more diversification (lower HHI value) results in higher risk-adjusted 
performance.  The implications of this coefficient are discussed further in the next section under the hypotheses 
evaluations.  The SHRE coefficient is positive for all five years, but is only statistically significant for 2008 through 
2010.  These results are the opposite of the predicted negative coefficient.  It was assumed that greater exposure to the 
real estate market, which was at the center of the recent financial crisis, would result in lower risk-based performance.  
However, this is not illustrated in the regression results.  This may be a reflection of the geographically-centered areas 
of significant real estate default.  In other words, some areas saw a significant increase in real estate defaults; 
however, others were not as severely impacted.  A second explanation is that real estate lending at smaller institutions 
was generally not as volatile as it was at larger institutions. 
The results for all five years show a positive relationship between membership in a multi-bank holding company and 
risk-adjusted performance; however, the coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level for only 2009 and 2011 and 
significant at the 0.10 level for 2008 and 2010.  This is consistent with the prediction of a positive relationship 
between MBHC and risk-adjusted performance and with the expectation of greater efficiency among bank 
subsidiaries (Holod & Peek, 2010; Newman & Shrieves, 1993) and the ability of stronger institutions to lend support 
to weaker banks (Holod & Peek, 2010). 
As expected, unemployment has an inverse relationship with risk-adjusted performance across the five models, with 
statistically significant values for 2008 through 2011.  The fact that unemployment rates were generally low across 
the nation in 2007 may be the cause for the lack of a significant relationship in that particular year.  Risk-based capital 
has a statistically significant direct relationship with risk-adjusted performance in all five years.  This confirms 
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previous results that risk-averse bank managers are more likely to operate with a higher level of capital protection 
(Acharya et al., 2006; Demsetz & Strahan, 1997; Stiroh, 2004a; Stiroh, 2004b). 
The coefficients for HHIGeo, HHIAct, TA, and TL/TA were not statistically significant in any of the five regression 
models.  Although the coefficients were negative for the geographic and activity diversification proxies, these results 
should not be relied upon given the lack of statistical significance.   
The regression coefficient for TA was negative for years 2007 through 2010 and positive for 2011; the coefficient for 
TL/TA was negative for 2007 through 2009 and positive for 2010 and 2011.  The results for TA are inconsistent with 
previous studies that have concluded increasing asset size is related to lower risk or improved performance for banks 
due to greater economies of scale or the use of more leverage (Wheelock & Wilson, 2001; Demsetz & Strahan, 1997; 
Elyasiani & Mehdian, 1995; Emmons et al., 2004).  Given that 2008 and 2009 were the years of the financial crisis 
exhibiting the lowest industry earnings, the results of this study indicate larger institutions were more vulnerable to 
the business cycle.  This may reflect a higher dependency on non-traditional fee sources which are considered to be 
more volatile.  The most significant loan losses were recognized from the fourth quarter of 2008 through the fourth 
quarter of 2010.  By 2011, charge-offs had declined, allowing for operating efficiencies to once again give large banks 
higher risk-based performance.  The negative coefficient for TL/TA during the peak years of the crisis (2007 through 
2009) indicates that the volatility stemming from the riskiness of the loan portfolio outweighed the higher earnings 
potential associated with a relatively high level of lending.  By 2010 and 2011, the higher returns associated with 
lending overwhelmed the associated volatility.      
As discussed in a previous section, the regression models were also run using the log of the dependent variable.  The 
transformed data results show statistically significant coefficients at the 0.05 level in at least one year for HHILoan (5 
years), SHRE(all but 2011), UNEMP (all but 2007), RBC  (2007, 2008, & 2011), and TL/TA (2009).  The signs of 
these coefficients are the same as with the nontransformed data models.  The primary difference between the two 
groups of results is the lack of a statistically significant positive coefficient for MBHC.  This may reflect that the 
strength of affiliated institutions is more critical for banks with a negative risk-based performance, which are not 
included in the transformed data models. 
4.6 Hypotheses Evaluation 
The regression results for all five years show that greater geographic, activity, and asset diversification are related to 
improved risk-based performance; however, only the results for asset diversification are statistically significant. 
Geographic diversification. The negative regression coefficient for geographic diversification shows an inverse 
relationship between HHIGeo and risk-based performance.  A lower HHIGeo represents more geographic 
diversification; therefore, an inverse relationship demonstrates that greater diversification improves risk-based 
performance.  However, the regression coefficients are not statistically significant for any of the five models; 
therefore, the results cannot be used to reject the null hypothesis. 
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Overall, the data shows that community banks are not very well diversified geographically.  Approximately one-half 
of the sample banks only operate within one MSA.  The lack of geographic diversification is consistent with 
Aubuchon and Wheelock’s (2010) findings that despite a relaxing of branching regulations, many banks still operate 
within a small geographic area. 
The data also indicates that geographic diversification is directly related to the size of the institution.  Table 16 depicts 
the mean geographic diversification HHI for four size categories and across the five years.  The geographic HHIs 
consistently decrease moving from the smallest banks included in the sample ($100 million-$250 million) to the 
largest ($750 million-$1 billion), but the greatest increase in diversification each year comes when considering banks 
greater than $750 million.  This is evidence that geographic diversification across MSAs is difficult until banks reach 
an asset size closer to $1 billion. 
Based on the results of this study, null hypothesis H0A, which states that geographic diversification has no relationship 
to risk-adjusted performance at U.S. community banks between 2007 and 2011, is not rejected. 
[Insert Table 16 Here] 
Activity diversification.  As with geographic diversification, the negative regression coefficients for HHIAct show that 
greater activity diversification is related to improved risk-based performance for all five years.  However, the lack of 
statistical significance once again prevents the related null hypothesis, H0B, from being rejected.  The inverse 
relationship is consistent with the premise that activity diversification allows for greater performance without a 
mitigating increase in revenue volatility that would reduce risk-adjusted performance.     
Similar to geographic diversification, activity diversification appears to increase as community banks increase in size.  
Table 17 shows the mean activity diversification HHIs for the sample banks in four asset size categories.  HHI values 
consistently fall when moving from the smallest to largest institutions.  This indicates that larger size is necessary to 
achieve greater activity diversification.  There also appears to be a trend to greater diversification across the five 
years, with the greater increases to diversification coming for the smallest institutions.   
The existing literature on revenue diversification makes a distinction between traditional and non-traditional sources 
of fee income, with non-traditional sources shown to be more volatile (DeYoung & Rice, 2004a & b).  As depicted in 
Table 18, a relatively low percentage of community bank NONII comes from the more risky and less traditional 
activities such as trading, venture capital, or securitization of assets.  Traditional sources include fiduciary fees (FID), 
service charges on deposit accounts (SRV), gains on the sales of assets (GAINS), and other noninterest income 
(OTH).  Non-traditional sources include trading revenue (TRAD), income from securities and insurance activities 
(S&I), venture capital revenues (VENT), net servicing fees (SERV), and net securitization income (SEC).  The data in 
Table 18 demonstrates that traditional fee sources continue to be the dominant source of noninterest income for 
community banks and that the largest community banks are more likely to engage in non-traditional revenue-
generating activities.  In addition, the very low or negative mean values for non-traditional noninterest income to total 
noninterest income in 2008 indicate exposure to the business cycle as 2008 is generally considered the high point of 
Estes /International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies Vol 3, No 4 , 2014  ISSN: 2147-4486 
 
18 
 
the financial crisis.  This volatility of non-traditional fee sources is consistent with DeYoung and Roland (1999) and 
DeYoung and Rice (2004).  However, non-traditional fee income is such a small factor of community bank income, 
that the increased volatility of this segment does not outweigh the potential benefits of diversification.  Therefore, the 
coefficient for activity diversification demonstrates that risk-adjusted performance increases with greater activity 
diversification. 
[Insert Table 17 Here] 
[Insert Table 18 Here] 
Asset diversification. The statistically significant negative regression coefficient for HHILoan in all five models 
indicates greater asset diversification is related to improved risk-adjusted performance.  This lends support for the 
proposition that a diversified portfolio can reduce risks while maximizing returns, a position consistent with portfolio 
theory (Markowitz, 1952; 1959) and some previous bank diversification studies (Deng et al., 2007; Stiroh, 2004b; 
Cotugno & Stefanelli, 2012).  It appears that the movement into a more diversified loan portfolio does not lead to 
deterioration in management effectiveness.  In contrast to geographic and activity diversification, size does not appear 
to be a factor in the level of loan portfolio diversification.  The smallest banks of the sample demonstrate just as 
much, if not more, diversification than the larger community banks. 
Based on the results of this study, null hypothesis H0C, which states that asset diversification has no relationship to 
risk-adjusted performance at U.S. community banks between 2007 and 2011, is rejected. 
[Insert Table 19 Here] 
Impact of coefficients. The impact on RAPROA of a change in diversification is quantified in Table 20 by 
demonstrating an increase in diversification from the five-year average maximum HHI value to the five-year average 
minimum HHI value.  The diversification change for each independent variable is given in the Max to Min Avg 
Diversification column.  The change to RAPROA from the increase in diversification is shown in the Impact on 
RAPROA column, along with the percentage of the impact to the five-year average RAPROA in the last column. 
[Insert Table 20 Here] 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
The linear regression models for each of the five years are statistically significant, but generally explain a relatively 
low level of the variation in risk-adjusted performance.  In summary, the key findings of this study are as follows: 
Greater diversification in the loan portfolio among the various types of loan products leads to greater risk-adjusted 
performance.  Bank management can strive to offer a variety of loan products and avoid a portfolio concentrated in 
only one or two types of loans. 
Affiliation with a multi-bank holding company has a positive impact on risk-adjusted performance. 
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Banks with higher levels of total risk-based capital, which serves as a proxy for management’s risk appetite, also 
enjoy stronger risk-based earnings. 
Unemployment in the local economy has a negative impact on risk-adjusted performance, which shows the 
vulnerability of financial institutions to overall economic conditions.  Management may want to consider stronger 
geographic diversification to reduce exposure to an economic downturn in one MSA. 
A greater share of assets secured by residential real estate in the form of either 1-4 family residential loans or 
mortgage-backed securities leads to higher risk-adjusted performance.  Although this type of lending was the source 
of significant risk on a national scale during the recent crisis, it does not appear that community banks experienced 
the same level of volatility. 
Community banks struggle to achieve geographic diversification as measured in this study.  Therefore, although the 
results show benefits to risk-based performance from geographically diversifying, the results are statistically 
insignificant. 
Traditional fee services continue to generate most of community bank noninterest revenue.  This allows these 
institutions to largely avoid the volatility generally associated with non-traditional sources.  Diversification among 
noninterest income was found to be beneficial for risk-based performance; however, these results were not 
statistically significant. 
Larger asset size was not beneficial for community banks during the years 2007 through 2010.  Although size shows a 
direct correlation with performance in 2011, the smaller community banks fared better during the previous years.  
The asset size coefficients are not statistically significant. 
Holding a larger percentage of assets in the loan portfolio negatively impacted performance during 2007 through 
2009, but was positive for 2010 and 2011.  The charge-offs associated with poorly performing loans likely 
overpowered the higher earnings generally credited to loans during the height of the financial crisis.  Once again, the 
coefficients for this variable are not statistically significant.  
A key limitation for this particular study was an appropriate measure for geographic diversification.  Although the 
calculated HHIGeo is able to measure diversification across MSAs, the results show that many community banks only 
operate within one MSA.  While that is informative, it does not allow the researcher to distinguish among institutions.  
This limitation likely reduced the significance of the geographic diversification results. 
There are several ways in which this particular study could be expanded to further assess the impact of bank 
diversification on performance.  First of all, the study could be expanded to include the analysis of institutions outside 
the size parameters used for community banks.  Given the systematic differences in bank earnings for different size 
groups, it would probably be best to analyze the smaller banks and larger banks as separate groups.  This would allow 
the researcher to determine if the results vary based on bank size.  However, the smallest institutions would likely 
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struggle to gain significant diversification in any of the three areas, therefore, the large bank results may be more 
informative. 
Future studies could also use other measures of performance, including risk-adjusted return on equity or a z-score.  A 
third possibility for publicly-traded firms is Tobin’s Q.  This would allow for a comparison of results generated from a 
balance-sheet focused variable versus those stemming from market opinion.   
Another area for potential research is to consider other proxies for activity diversification.  One possibility would be 
to explore the relative importance of noninterest income as compared with interest income.  This particular study only 
assessed the importance of variability in noninterest income, but did not assess the impact of overall fee income 
reliance on risk-adjusted performance.  Second, it may be beneficial to consider the impact of traditional commercial 
bank fee income sources, such as deposit account charges or trust department income, versus nontraditional sources, 
such as venture capital or securitization fees. 
Another suggestion for future research is to compare the results generated from a time of financial crisis to years 
following the crisis.  Given some variation in this study’s models across the years, some of which may be explained 
by the severity of the crisis during that year, it seems reasonable to assume that different results may be gleaned from 
a period of relative calm in the industry.  Structured appropriately, the researcher may also be able to determine if 
managers have changed strategies with regard to diversification since the crisis. 
A final suggestion is to incorporate the use of panel data analysis techniques, such as fixed effects regression models.  
These statistical techniques would allow the researcher to analyze the change in risk-adjusted performance from a 
change in the independent variables over time within specific units. 
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Table 1: Data from Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports)       
        
     
        
Data Identifier 
Call 
Report 
Schedule Call Report Line Number 
      2007 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
Income from fiduciary activities FID RI - 
Income 
Statement 
RIAD4070 RIAD4070 RIAD4070 RIAD4070 RIAD4070 
Service charges on deposit accounts SRV RI - 
Income 
Statement 
RIAD4080 RIAD4080 RIAD4080 RIAD4080 RIAD4080 
Trading Revenue TRAD RI - 
Income 
Statement 
RIADA220 RIADA220 RIADA220 RIADA220 RIADA220 
Fees and commissions from securities brokerage, investment banking, 
annuity sales, and insurance 
S&I RI - 
Income 
Statement 
RIADC886, 
888, 887, 
386, 387 
RIADC886, 
888, 887, 386, 
387 
 RIADC886, 
888, 887, 386, 
387 
 RIADC886, 
888, 887, 386, 
387 
 RIADC886, 
888, 887, 386, 
387 
Venture capital revenue VENT RI - 
Income 
Statement 
RIADB491 RIADB491 RIADB491 RIADB491 RIADB491 
Net servicing fees SERV RI - 
Income 
Statement 
RIADB492 RIADB492 RIADB492 RIADB492 RIADB492 
Net securitization income SEC RI - 
Income 
Statement 
RIADB493 RIADB493 RIADB493 RIADB493 RIADB493 
Gains on sales of loans, leases, other real estate, and other assets GAINS RI - 
Income 
Statement 
RIAD5416, 
5415, 
RIADB496 
RIAD5416, 
5415, 
RIADB496 
RIAD5416, 
5415, 
RIADB496 
RIAD5416, 
5415, 
RIADB496 
RIAD5416, 
5415, 
RIADB496 
Other noninterest income OTH RI - 
Income 
Statement 
RIADB497 RIADB497 RIADB497 RIADB497 RIADB497 
Total noninterest income NON RI - 
Income 
Statement 
RIAD4079 RIAD4079 RIAD4079 RIAD4079 RIAD4079 
1-4 family residential loans 1-4RE RC-C 
Loans and 
Leases 
RCON1797, 
5367, 5368 
RCON1797, 
5367, 5368 
RCON1797, 
5367, 5368 
RCON1797, 
5367, 5368 
RCON1797, 
5367, 5368 
Construction, land development, and other land loans CONST RC-C 
Loans and 
Leases 
RCON1415  RCONF158, 
159 
 RCONF158, 
160 
 RCONF158, 
161 
 RCONF158, 
162 
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Loans secured by farmland FARM RC-C 
Loans and 
Leases 
RCON1420 RCON1420 RCON1420 RCON1420 RCON1420 
Loans secured by multifamily properties MULTI RC-C 
Loans and 
Leases 
RCON1460 RCON1460 RCON1460 RCON1460 RCON1460 
Secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties CRE RC-C 
Loans and 
Leases 
RCON1480 RCONF160,161 RCONF160,162 RCONF160,163 RCONF160,164 
Agricultural loans AG RC-C 
Loans and 
Leases 
RCON1590 RCON1590 RCON1590 RCON1590 RCON1590 
Commercial and industrial loans CI RC-C 
Loans and 
Leases 
RCON1766 RCON1766 RCON1766 RCON1766 RCON1766 
Consumer and credit card loans CONS RC-C 
Loans and 
Leases 
RCONB538, 
539, 
RCON2011 
RCONB538, 
539, 
RCON2012 
RCONB538, 
539, 
RCON2013 
RCONB538, 
539, 
RCON2014 
RCONB538, 
539, 
RCONK137, 
RCONK207 
Other loans OTH RC-C 
Loans and 
Leases 
RCON1288, 
2081, 2107, 
1563, 2165, 
2123 
RCON1288, 
2081, 2107, 
1563, 2165, 
2124 
RCON1288, 
2081, 2107, 
1563, 2165, 
2125 
RCON1288, 
2081, 2107, 
RCONJ454, 
464, 
RCON2165, 
2123 
RCON1288, 
2081, 2107, 
RCONJ454, 
464, 
RCON2165, 
2124 
Total loans LOANS RC-C 
Loans and 
Leases 
RCON2122 RCON2122 RCON2122 RCON2122 RCON2122 
Mortgage-backed securities MBS RC-B 
Securities 
RCON1698, 
1702, 1703, 
1707, 1709, 
1713, 1714, 
1717, 1718, 
1732 
RCON1698, 
1702, 1703, 
1707, 1709, 
1713, 1714, 
1717, 1718, 
1733 
RCONG300, 
303, 304, 307, 
308, 311, 312, 
315, 316, 319, 
320, 323, 324, 
327, 328, 331 
RCONG300, 
303, 304, 307, 
308, 311, 312, 
315, 316, 319, 
320, 323, 324, 
327, 328, 331 
RCONG300, 
303, 304, 307, 
308, 311, 312, 
315, 316, 319, 
320, 323, 
RCONK142, 
145, 146, 149, 
150, 153, 154, 
157 
Total assets TA RC - 
Balance 
Sheet 
RCON2170 RCON2170 RCON2170 RCON2170 RCON2170 
Net income NI RI - 
Income 
Statement 
RIAD4340 RIAD4340 RIAD4340 RIAD4340 RIAD4340 
Total risk-based capital ratio RBC RC-R 
Regulatory 
Capital 
RCON 7205 RCON 7206 RCON 7207 RCON 7208 RCON 7209 
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  Table 2. Summary of Deposits Data 
 Field Definition 
ADDRESBR Address (Branch) 
ADDRESS Address (Institution) 
CERT FDIC Certificate Number 
CNTYNAMB County Name (Branch) 
DEPDOM Deposits, Total Domestic - Institution 
DEPSUMBR Deposits (Branch)(in thousands of dollars) 
HCTMULT Multi-Bank Holding Company flag 
MSABR Metropolitan Statistical areas 
MSANAMB Metropolitan Statistical area Name 
TOTBR Total Branches 
TOTDEP Total Deposits - Institution 
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Table 3. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable   Definition 
Dependent Variable:   
  RAPROA Annual ROA divided by the 2007-2011 standard deviation of ROA 
      
Diversification Measures:   
  HHIGeo HHI of bank deposits across MSAs 
      
  HHIAct HHI of a bank's noninterest income sources 
      
  HHILoan HHI of a bank's loan portfolio mix 
      
Control Variables:   
  
SHRE 
Percentage of bank assets comprised of 1-4 family residential real estate loans or mortgage-backed securities 
      
  TA Bank asset size in dollars 
      
  
MBHC 
Equals 1 if the bank is part of a multi-bank holding company; Equals 0 if not 
      
  UNEMP Annual MSA unemployment rate 
      
  RBC Total Risk-Based Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets  
      
  TL/TA Percentage of bank's assets held in the loan portfolio 
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Table 4. 2007 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Min Max Range Mean St. Dev. Skewness 
Std. 
Error Kurtosis 
Std. 
Error 
RAPROA 490 -10.6801 32.8963 43.5764 3.9858 4.7324 2.7340 0.1100 11.1710 0.2200 
HHIGeo 490 0.2902 1.0000 0.7551 0.8455 0.1997 -0.9330 0.1100 -0.5730 0.2200 
HHIAct 490 0.2165 0.9573 0.7408 0.4608 0.1384 0.7660 0.1100 0.5310 0.2200 
HHILoan 490 0.1490 0.9653 0.8163 0.3021 0.1337 2.1930 0.1100 5.8290 0.2200 
SHRE 490 0.0093 0.9067 0.8974 0.2659 0.1576 1.0750 0.1100 1.1270 0.2200 
TA 490 100,272.00 988,365.00 888,093.00 319,845.70 207,015.52 1.3440 0.1100 1.0840 0.2200 
Unemp 490 2.0750 8.5333 6.4583 4.3508 0.8835 0.6330 0.1100 2.0870 0.2200 
RBCapital 490 0.0480 0.4911 0.4431 0.1499 0.0563 2.4460 0.1100 7.9680 0.2200 
L/A 490 0.0895 0.9559 0.8664 0.6940 0.1322 -0.9900 0.1100 1.4030 0.2200 
 
Table 5. 2008 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Min Max Range Mean St. Dev. Skewness 
Std. 
Error Kurtosis 
Std. 
Error 
RAPROA 484 -12.0943 34.9127 47.0070 3.2723 4.8855 2.6320 0.1110 10.6410 0.2220 
HHIGeo 484 0.2838 1.0000 0.7833 0.8406 0.2014 -0.8950 0.1110 -0.6060 0.2220 
HHIAct 484 0.2095 0.9676 0.7581 0.4490 0.1388 0.9830 0.1110 1.2010 0.2220 
HHILoan 484 0.1491 0.9728 0.8237 0.2993 0.1304 2.2090 0.1110 6.0550 0.2220 
SHRE 484 0.0079 0.8958 0.8879 0.2851 0.1596 0.9730 0.1110 0.8860 0.2220 
TA 484 94,447.00 998,546.00 904,099.00 335,418.17 214,667.27 1.3070 0.1110 0.9920 0.2220 
Unemp 484 2.7500 10.5000 7.7500 5.2681 1.1391 0.5760 0.1110 1.6550 0.2220 
RBCapital 484 0.0530 0.5046 0.4516 0.1467 0.0555 2.6070 0.1110 9.8500 0.2220 
L/A 484 0.0816 0.9579 0.8763 0.7006 0.1356 -1.0300 0.1110 1.4300 0.2220 
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Table 6. 2009 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Min Max Range Mean St. Dev. Skewness 
Std. 
Error Kurtosis 
Std. 
Error 
RAPROA 461 -3.0791 32.5516 35.6303 2.9838 4.9741 2.6290 0.1140 9.8300 0.2270 
HHIGeo 461 0.2864 1.0000 0.7578 0.8360 0.2018 -0.8560 0.1140 -0.6370 0.2270 
HHIAct 461 0.1921 0.9458 0.7537 0.4337 0.1377 1.0440 0.1140 1.5000 0.2270 
HHILoan 461 0.1458 0.9704 0.8247 0.3027 0.1280 2.1810 0.1140 6.1410 0.2270 
SHRE 461 0.0073 0.8323 0.8250 0.2804 0.1523 0.9100 0.1140 0.7150 0.2270 
TA 461 105,247.00 1,040,094.00 934,847.00 347,578.03 213,520.68 1.2640 0.1140 0.9100 0.2270 
Unemp 461 3.7333 15.2250 11.4917 8.3715 1.8291 0.2760 0.1140 0.7290 0.2270 
RBCapital 461 0.0280 0.5278 0.4998 0.1495 0.0565 2.5630 0.1140 10.4380 0.2270 
L/A 461 0.0779 0.9416 0.8637 0.6751 0.1321 -0.8540 0.1140 1.1000 0.2270 
 
Table 7. 2010 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Min Max Range Mean St. Dev. Skewness 
Std. 
Error Kurtosis 
Std. 
Error 
RAPROA 437 -2.4734 32.4785 34.9518 3.4406 5.1072 2.5470 0.1170 9.1520 0.2330 
HHIGeo 437 0.2899 1.0000 0.7489 0.8280 0.2039 -0.7550 0.1170 -0.8440 0.2330 
HHIAct 437 0.2000 0.9221 0.7221 0.4200 0.1394 1.2660 0.1170 1.9590 0.2330 
HHILoan 437 0.1348 0.9598 0.8250 0.3070 0.1252 1.9960 0.1170 5.2580 0.2330 
SHRE 437 0.0038 0.7814 0.7776 0.2818 0.1451 0.7770 0.1170 0.6430 0.2330 
TA 437 97,831.00 995,403.00 897,572.00 342,747.58 210,480.48 1.3120 0.1170 1.0590 0.2330 
Unemp 437 3.7667 17.2500 13.4833 8.5770 1.8532 0.3940 0.1170 1.8090 0.2330 
RBCapital 437 0.0349 0.5572 0.5223 0.1579 0.0602 2.4810 0.1170 10.1790 0.2330 
L/A 437 0.0761 0.9327 0.8565 0.6591 0.1285 -0.8040 0.1170 1.0660 0.2330 
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Table 8. 2011 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Min Max Range Mean St. Dev. Skewness 
Std. 
Error Kurtosis 
Std. 
Error 
RAPROA 423 -2.6331 33.4146 36.0477 3.6326 5.0684 2.5200 0.1190 8.9300 0.2370 
HHIGeo 423 0.2775 1.0000 0.7596 0.8299 0.2008 -0.7550 0.1190 -0.8200 0.2370 
HHIAct 423 0.2084 0.9956 0.7871 0.4091 0.1306 1.3510 0.1190 2.6830 0.2370 
HHILoan 423 0.1456 0.9904 0.8449 0.3120 0.1255 1.9700 0.1190 5.4260 0.2370 
SHRE 423 0.0180 0.8226 0.8046 0.2898 0.1484 0.7710 0.1190 0.5510 0.2370 
TA 423 95,433.00 986,320.00 890,887.00 346,408.52 210,648.41 1.2700 0.1190 0.8930 0.2370 
Unemp 423 3.3750 16.8750 13.5000 7.9721 1.7978 0.5670 0.1190 2.3900 0.2370 
RBCapital 423 0.0089 0.5723 0.5634 0.1678 0.0648 2.2460 0.1190 9.3340 0.2370 
L/A 423 0.0772 0.9320 0.8547 0.6335 0.1319 -0.7290 0.1190 0.8430 0.2370 
 
Table 9. MBHC Frequencies. 
1=Multi-bank holding company; 
0=One-bank holding company or no holding company 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
0 426 418 401 385 373 
1 64 66 60 52 50 
Total 490 484 461 437 423 
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Table 10. 2007 Correlation Matrix 
Variable RAPROA HHIGeo HHIAct HHILoan SHRE TA HCTMULT Unemp Rate RBC TL/TA 
RAPROA 1                   
                      
HHIGeo -0.039 1                 
  (0.391                   
HHIAct -0.049 0.081* 1               
  (0.281) (0.071)                 
HHILoan -0.129*** 0.193*** 0.160*** 1             
  (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)               
SHRE 0.021 0.183*** -0.073 0.523*** 1           
  (0.648) (0.000) (0.102) (0.000)             
TA -0.066 -0.212*** -0.266*** 0.059 0.046 1         
  (0.146) (0.000) (0.000) (0.190) (0.301)           
HCTMULT 0.068 -0.071 0.014 -0.122*** -0.101** 0.011 1       
  (0.133) (0.113) (0.758) (0.006) (0.025) (0.809)         
Unemp Rate -0.007 0.120*** 0.002 0.134*** 0.168*** 0.003 0.041 1     
  (0.875) (0.008) (0.969) (0.003) (0.000) (0.943) (0.366)       
RBC 0.105** 0.206*** 0.17*** 0.37*** 0.287*** -0.139*** -0.089** 0.059 1   
  (0.02) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.048) (0.192)     
TL/TA -0.116*** -0.133*** -0.072 -0.088* -0.167*** 0.114** -0.101** -0.012 -0.465*** 1 
  (0.01) (0.003) (0.108) (0.049) (0.000) (0.011) (0.024) (0.796) (0.000)   
Note.  ***, **, and * mean the value is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level of significance, respectively. 
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Table 11. 2008 Correlation Matrix 
Variable RAPROA HHIGeo HHIAct HHILoan SHRE TA HCTMULT Unemp Rate RBC TL/TA 
RAPROA 1                   
                      
HHIGeo -0.051 1                 
  (0.261)                   
HHIAct 0.003 0.085* 1               
  (0.951) (0.061)                 
HHILoan -0.079* 0.224*** 0.142*** 1             
  (0.081) (0.000) (0.002)               
SHRE 0.071 0.187*** -0.108** 0.545*** 1           
  (0.117) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000)             
TA -0.064 -0.217*** -0.221*** 0.043 0.036 1         
  (0.160) (0.000) (0.000) (0.341) (0.434)           
HCTMULT 0.086* -0.061 0.011 -0.103** -0.094** -0.004 1       
  (0.059) (0.181) (0.804) (0.024) (0.038) (0.934)         
Unemp Rate -0.118*** 0.131*** 0.017 0.196*** 0.153*** 0.031 -0.035 1     
  (0.009) (0.004) (0.715) (0.000) (0.001) (0.494) (0.440)       
RBC 0.170*** 0.186*** 0.205*** 0.365*** 0.297*** -0.148*** -0.072 0.032 1   
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.115) (0.478)     
TL/TA -0.154*** -0.113** -0.097** -0.101** -0.228*** 0.102** -0.078* -0.018 -0.466*** 1 
  (0.001) (0.013) (0.034) (0.026) (0.000) (0.025) (0.087) (0.691) (0.000)   
Note.  ***, **, and * mean the value is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level of significance, respectively. 
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Table 12. 2009 Correlation Matrix 
 
Note.  ***, **, and * mean the value is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level of significance, respectively. 
 
Variable RAPROA HHIGeo HHIAct HHILoan SHRE TA HCTMULT Unemp Rate RBC TL/TA 
RAPROA 1                   
                      
HHIGeo -0.036 1                 
  (0.437)                   
HHIAct -0.014 0.09* 1               
  (0.767) (0.055)                 
HHILoan -0.058 0.242*** 0.14*** 1             
  (0.211) (0.000) (0.003)               
SHRE 0.115** 0.169*** -0.145*** 0.489*** 1           
  (0.014) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)             
TA -0.098** -0.236*** -0.225*** 0.02 0.038 1         
  (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.669) (0.415)           
HCTMULT 0.125*** -0.032 0.006 -0.091** -0.064 0.006 1       
  (0.007) (0.491) (0.891) (0.05) (0.17) (0.893)         
Unemp Rate -0.15*** 0.145*** -0.059 0.191*** 0.143*** 0.049 -0.054 1     
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.204) (0.000) (0.002) (0.296) (0.248)       
RBC 0.205*** 0.124*** 0.143*** 0.354*** 0.273*** -0.142*** -0.02 -0.008 1   
  (0.000) (0.008) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.668) (0.865)     
TL/TA -0.146*** -0.071 -0.068 -0.125*** -0.236*** 0.041 -0.094** -0.041 -0.468*** 1 
  (0.002) (0.127) (0.145) (0.007) (0.000) (0.379) (0.044) (0.382) (0.000)   
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Table 13. 2010 Correlation Matrix 
Variable RAPROA HHIGeo HHIAct HHILoan SHRE TA HCTMULT Unemp Rate RBC TL/TA 
RAPROA 1                   
                      
HHIGeo -0.034 1                 
  (0.476)                   
HHIAct -0.035 0.08* 1               
  (0.464) (0.093)                 
HHILoan -0.08* 0.239*** 0.202*** 1             
  (0.094) (0.000) (0.000)               
SHRE 0.065 0.162*** -0.118** 0.445*** 1           
  (0.174) (0.001) (0.013) (0.000)             
TA -0.04 -0.261*** -0.198*** 0.02 0.084* 1         
  (0.406 (0.000) (0.000) (0.673) (0.078)           
HCTMULT 0.091* -0.094* -0.012 -0.097** -0.118** 0.011 1       
  (0.057) (0.051) (0.808) (0.043) (0.014) (0.817)         
Unemp Rate -0.158*** 0.121** 0.028 0.279*** 0.133*** 0.053 -0.076 1     
  (0.001) (0.011) (0.562) (0.000) (0.005) (0.267) (0.111)       
RBC 0.185*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.345*** 0.252*** -0.067 -0.014 0.067 1   
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.161) (0.773) (0.164)     
TL/TA -0.107** -0.053 -0.049 -0.074 -0.169*** 0.027 -0.004 -0.067 -0.504*** 1 
  (0.026) (0.272) (0.310) (0.124) (0.000) (0.577) (0.929) (0.162) (0.000)   
Note.  ***, **, and * mean the value is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level of significance, respectively. 
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Table 14. 2011 Correlation Matrix 
Variable RAPROA HHIGeo HHIAct HHILoan SHRE TA HCTMULT Unemp Rate RBC TL/TA 
RAPROA 1                   
                      
HHIGeo -0.033 1                 
  -0.497                   
HHIAct -0.049 0.06 1               
  -0.319 (0.217)                 
HHILoan -0.119** 0.236*** 0.186*** 1             
  (0.014) (0.000) (0.000)               
SHRE 0.012 0.183*** -0.065 0.451*** 1           
  (0.809) (0.000) (0.181) (0.000)             
TA -0.007 -0.224*** -0.149*** 0.024 0.08* 1         
  (0.892) (0.000) (0.002) (0.627) (0.1)           
HCTMULT 0.13*** -0.077 0.029 -0.105** -0.118** 0.031 1       
  (0.008) (0.113) (0.554) (0.031) (0.015) (0.523)         
Unemp 
Rate -0.171*** 0.081* 0.088* 0.255*** 0.132*** 0.041 -0.089* 1     
  (0.000) (0.098) (0.07) (0.000) (0.007) (0.399) (0.066)       
RBC 0.154*** 0.13*** 0.043 0.311*** 0.239*** -0.055 -0.027 0.092* 1   
  (0.001) (0.007) (0.374) (0.000) (0.000) (0.26) (0.586) (0.058)     
TL/TA -0.082 0.002 .02 -0.039 -0.174*** 0.009 0.005 -0.062 -0.499*** 1 
  (0.09) (0.966) (0.68) (0.429) (0.000) (0.851) 0.918 (0.203) (0.000)   
Note.  ***, **, and * mean the value is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level of significance, respectively. 
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Table 15. Regression Results 
Dependent Variable:  Risk-Adjusted ROA (RAPROA)       
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Intercept 7.07*** 6.737*** 6.028** 5.474** 5.110** 
  (3.116) (2.924) (2.461) (2.149) (2.118) 
HHIGeo -1.330 -1.638 -1.165 -0.842 -0.375 
  (1.195) (-1.442) (-0.995) (-0.674) (-0.296) 
HHIAct -1.793 -0.052 -0.709 -0.935 -0.496 
  (-1.097) (-0.031) (-0.410) (-0.514) (-0.26) 
HHILoan -7.367*** -6.959*** -6.429*** -5.994** -6.624*** 
  (3.727) (-3.253) (3.101) (-2.514) (-2.811) 
SHRE 2.665 4.323** 5.468*** 3.762** 2.456 
  (1.637) (2.541) (3.101) (1.968) (1.314) 
Total Assets (TA) -0.000001301 -0.0000008964 -0.000001893 -0.0000009329 0.00000001208 
  (-1.197) (-0.844) (-1.716) (-0.78) (0.01) 
Multi-Bank Holding Co (MBHC) 0.800 1.166* 1.683** 1.251* 1.770** 
  (1.258) (1.841) (2.545) (1.701) (2.376) 
Unemployment Rate -0.002 -0.416** -0.342*** -0.367*** -0.408*** 
  (-0.010) (-2.153) (-2.747) (-2.747) (-2.967) 
Total Risk-Based Capital (RBC) 12.841*** 16.565*** 17.871*** 19.238*** 17.08*** 
  (2.764) (3.448) (3.742) (3.927) (3.781) 
Total Loans/Total Assets (TL/TA) -1.756 -1.872 -1.06 0.173 0.895 
  (-0.957) (-1.019) (-0.548) (0.08) (0.421) 
No. Observations 490 484 461 437 423 
R-Square 0.063 0.089 0.118 0.092 0.093 
Adjusted R-Square 0.045 0.072 0.100 0.073 0.073 
F-test 3.571*** 5.165*** 6.682*** 4.81*** 4.682*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Note.  ***, **, and * mean the value is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level of significance, respectively. 
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Table 16. Geographic Diversification Means by Asset Size & ANOVA Test Results 
 
  
Total Assets 
$100M-$250M 
Total Assets 
$250M-$500M 
Total Assets 
$500M-$750M 
Total Assets 
$750M-$1B Total F-Statistic p-value 
2007 0.8728 0.8341 0.8243 0.6853 0.8445 8.480 0.000 
n 259 157 55 29 500     
2008 0.8715 0.8312 0.8196 0.7074 0.8412 6.947 0.000 
n 234 159 62 31 486     
2009 0.8759 0.8169 0.8498 0.6669 0.8364 11.729 0.000 
n 203 166 60 33 462     
2010 0.8767 0.8036 0.8131 0.6826 0.8288 10.255 0.000 
n 194 162 53 30 439     
2011 0.8629 0.8217 0.7967 0.7280 0.8303 4.977 0.002 
n 189 154 51 30 424     
 
 
Table 17. Activity Diversification Means by Asset Size & ANOVA Test Results 
  
Total Assets 
$100M-$250M 
Total Assets 
$250M-$500M 
Total Assets 
$500M-$750M 
Total Assets 
$750M-$1B Total F-Statistic p-value 
2007 0.4952 0.4471 0.3929 0.3853 0.4624 13.510 0.000 
n 259 157 55 29 500     
2008 0.4808 0.4396 0.3842 0.4075 0.4501 9.920 0.000 
n 234 159 62 31 486     
2009 0.4681 0.4255 0.3832 0.3723 0.4349 9.463 0.000 
n 203 166 60 33 462     
2010 0.4466 0.4169 0.3795 0.3628 0.4218 5.481 0.000 
n 194 162 53 30 439     
2011 0.4304 0.4042 0.3807 0.3675 0.4104 3.451 0.017 
n 189 154 51 30 424     
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Table 18. Non-Traditional Noninterest Income/Total Noninterest Income by Size Groups 
Asset Size 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
$100 Million - $250 Million 0.0678 -0.0882 0.0660 0.0697 0.0649 
$250 Million - $500 Million 0.0851 0.0006 0.0751 0.0917 0.0906 
$500 Million - $750 Million 0.1072 0.0003 0.0893 0.0299 0.0896 
$750 Million - $1 Billion 0.0855 0.0002 0.0968 0.1075 0.1189 
 
 
Table 19. Asset Diversification Means by Asset Size & ANOVA Test Results 
  
Total Assets 
$100M-$250M 
Total Assets 
$250M-$500M 
Total Assets 
$500M-$750M 
Total Assets 
$750M-$1B Total F-Statistic p-value 
2007 0.2995 0.2978 0.3246 0.3149 0.3026 0.680 0.565 
n 258 157 55 2 500     
2008 0.2962 0.2918 0.3265 0.3062 0.2993 1.147 0.330 
n 233 159 62 31 486     
2009 0.3042 0.2935 0.3324 0.2855 0.3027 1.574 0.195 
n 202 166 60 33 462     
2010 0.3100 0.2981 0.3275 0.3045 0.3073 0.779 0.506 
n 193 162 53 30 439     
2011 0.3110 0.3088 0.3135 0.3310 0.3120 0.267 0.849 
n 188 154 51 30 424     
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Table 20. Impact of Diversification Changes on RAPROA 
Variable 5-yr Avg 5-yr Avg Min 5-yr Avg Max 
5-yr Avg 
Coefficient 
Max to Min Avg 
Diversification 
Impact on 
RAPROA 
Percent of Avg 
RAPROA 
RAPROA 3.463 -6.192 33.251 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
HHIGeo 0.836 0.286 1.000 -1.070 -0.714 0.764 22% 
HHIAct 0.435 0.205 0.958 -0.797 -0.752 0.600 17% 
HHILoan 0.305 0.145 0.972 -6.675 -0.827 5.520 159% 
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Appendix:  Regression Results with log RAPROA 
Dependent Variable:  Log10 of Risk-Adjusted ROA (RAPROA)       
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Intercept 0.601** 0.72** 1.135*** 0.719** 0.667** 
  (-2.527) (2.299) (3.327) (2.316) (2.36) 
HHIGeo -0.172 -0.245 0.038 -0.110 -0.125 
  (-1.495) (-1.573) (0.227) (-0.709) (-0.823) 
HHIAct 0.105 0.140 -0.07 0.449* 0.17 
  (-0.609) (0.615) (-0.276) (1.948) (0.773) 
HHILoan -0.716*** -0.984*** -0.658** -0.759*** -0.557** 
  (-3.314) (3.328) (-2.14) (-2.746) (-2.084) 
SHRE 0.533*** 0.966*** 0.574** 0.814*** 0.34 
  (-3.05) (4.057) (2.245) (3.608) (1.594) 
Total Assets (TA) -0.0000001473 -0.0000002028 -0.0000001975 -0.00000002013 0.00000003191 
  (-1.286) (-1.359) (-1.225) (-0.135) (0.23) 
Multi-Bank Holding Co (MBHC) 0.079 0.14 0.004 0.168* 0.109 
  (-1.195) (1.611) (0.048) (1.849) (1.272) 
Unemployment Rate -0.013 -0.062** -0.045** -0.05*** -0.057*** 
  (-0.494) (-2.275) (-2.469) (-3.045) (-3.527) 
Total Risk-Based Capital (RBC) 1.506*** 1.557** 0.727 0.878 1.235** 
  (-3.067) (2.432) (1.08) (1.442) (2.239) 
Total Loans/Total Assets (TL/TA) -0.249 -0.17 -0.642** -0.195 0.082 
  (-1.293) (-0.682) (-2.384) (-0.753) (0.335) 
No. Observations 471 401 348 343 356 
R-Square 0.083 0.106 0.083 0.103 0.072 
Adjusted R-Square 0.065 0.086 0.059 0.079 0.048 
F-test 4.648*** 5.175*** 3.413*** 4.257*** 2.972*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Note.  ***, **, and * mean the value is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level of significance, respectively. 
